MD top court weighs gang promotion law in graffiti case

MD top court weighs gang promotion law in graffiti case

MD top court weighs gang promotion law in graffiti case 

The Daily Record

Rachel Konieczny//June 18, 2025

The Maryland Supreme Court heard arguments earlier this month in a case where the high court will decide whether a trial court had sufficient evidence to convict a Montgomery County man of promoting a criminal organization when he stood next to a codefendant who spray-painted a gang symbol on a public wall.

The case, Jamal Antoine Williams v. State of Maryland, centers the interpretation of § 9-805 of the Maryland Criminal Law Code, which prohibits a person from organizing, supervising, promoting, sponsoring, financing, or managing a criminal organization and subjects the individual to a maximum prison sentence of 20 years, a fine of up to $1 million, or both.

Williams is arguing the Maryland Appellate Court’s October ruling that the Montgomery County Circuit Court had sufficient evidence to convict him for promoting a criminal organization when he stood near a co-defendant who spray-painted a gang symbol on a wall at the Silver Spring Civic Center runs counter to the statute’s legislative history that Williams says was intended to target gang kingpins.

Isabelle Raquin, counsel for Williams, argued the high court should narrowly define ‘promote’ “as an act that actively advances the underlying crimes of a criminal organization in a way that is consistent with a leadership role.”

“This is an absurd result that turns the misdemeanor offense of defacing property into the federal crime of promoting a criminal organization under a statute that was intended for and created with the process of targeting gang kingpins,” Raquin said of the appellate court’s ruling during argument before the high court earlier this month. “By defining ‘promote’ as broadly as it has, the Appellate Court of Maryland has created a super statute that engulfs all of the above provisions in the subtitle that includes innocent conduct now subjected to a 20-year felony offense and also infringes upon constitutionally protected activities.”

Derek Simmonsen, assistant attorney general for Maryland, said the question before the high court “is a straightforward case of statutory interpretation,” where Williams’ position “would require the court to significantly revise the statute absent legislative intent.” Simmonsen added that applying the plain meaning of ‘promote’ with mens rea also eliminates any constitutional problems and provides sufficient guidance to courts that may interpret the statute in the future.

But Justice Jonathan Biran pressed Simmonsen on the state’s interpretation of the 20-year maximum penalty for violations to § 9-805.

“Do you think the maximum penalty that the General Assembly has provided for § 9-805 has no interpretive significance for us in trying to understand the meaning of the words that can bring that maximum penalty?” Biran asked Simmonsen.

Simmonsen said a wide range of behavior could potentially fit within the statute, where there may be varying levels of culpability and varying levels of seriousness as to the nature of the crime.

“I think the question is: is it this court’s place, and sort of as a policy matter, to decide [if] the statute… makes sense as to what’s being targeted here,” Simmonsen said.

The justices, in asking Simmonsen several hypothetical questions as to the application of § 9-805, seemed to be considering potential future situations where a person could be found to have violated the statute, but Simmonsen said the court does not necessarily need to reach all of those issues in deciding this case.

“I do think the two pieces that could flow from this case that could inform the interpretation of the other provisions would again be the plain reading of the terms itself and the mens rea aspect,” Simmonsen reiterated.

On rebuttal, Raquin argued that there is nothing that shows legislators intended to broaden the scope of § 9-805 to include low-level participants or include innocent conduct such as Williams’.

“The fact that there is absolutely nothing that contradicts the initial legislative intent when we apply all the principles of statutory interpretation [means] ‘promote’ has to be narrowly defined as the act that advances the criminal organization by higher-level participants,” Raquin said.