MD Supreme Court vacates conviction that used Maryland Gang Statute in 2022
BOTTOM LINE: Where a man was convicted of promoting a criminal
organization, because he stood by while another man spray painted a gang
message on a wall, his conviction was vacated. There was no indication he
ever occupied any leadership role in the gang or that he directed, planned or
otherwise exercised discretion in connection with the offense.
CASE: Williams v. State, No. 44, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed July 30. 2025)
(Justices Fader, Booth, BIRAN, Eaves, Killough) (Justices GOULD, Getty
dissent).
FACTS: Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law, or CR, § 9-805(a) currently makes it a
felony to “organize, supervise, promote, sponsor, finance, or manage a
criminal organization.” A “criminal organization” is defined as an enterprise
whose members, among other things, have as one of their primary objectives
or activities the commission of certain crimes.
In May 2022, the state charged Jamal Antoine Williams under CR § 9- 805,
alleging that he “promote[d] a criminal organization[.]” The criminal
organization Mr. Williams was alleged to have promoted was the Rollin 30s
Crips, which is a set of the transnational gang known as the Crips. Mr.
Williams’s alleged act of promotion was standing watch while a leader of the
gang spray-painted the message “Roll Three N 30s Crip” on a wall at
Veteran’s Plaza in Silver Spring, Maryland.
After Mr. Williams waived a jury trial and the parties stipulated to the relevant
facts, a circuit court judge found Mr. Williams guilty of promoting a criminal
organization, in violation of CR § 9-805. The Appellate Court of Maryland
affirmed.
LAW: The court holds that, to obtain a conviction under CR § 9-805, the state
must prove the defendant had knowledge that the organization the defendant
organized, supervised, promoted, sponsored, financed, or managed was, in
fact, a “criminal organization” within the meaning of the statute.
It further holds that the General Assembly intended CR § 9-805 to function
effectively as a “kingpin” statute. That is, it is designed to reach acts
committed by those who exercise a leadership role within a criminal
organization or who – if they are not members of the organization – exercise
discretion consistent with leadership with respect to the prohibited act.
Here, the state was required to prove, among other things, that: (1) Mr.
Williams knew the Rollin 30s Crips was a “criminal organization” as that term
is defined in CR § 9-801(c) and (2) Mr. Williams exercised a leadership role in
the Rollin 30s Crips or – if he was not a member of the gang at the time of the
offense – that he exercised discretionary authority with respect to the act of
promotion.
This court need not examine whether the stipulated facts were sufficient to
prove that Mr. Williams knew the Rollin 30s Crips was a “criminal
organization.” Regardless of his knowledge, it is clear that the state did not
introduce evidence that Mr. Williams exercised a leadership role within the
Rollin 30s Crips or, if he was no longer a member of the gang at the time of
the offense, that he exercised discretionary authority with respect to the
defacement of the wall at Veteran’s Plaza.
The extent of the state’s evidence was that Mr. Williams stood watch while Mr.
Dowdy – the “leader of their individual set” of the Crips – spray-painted the
gang-related message on the wall, after which Mr. Williams posed for
photographs. There is no indication that Mr. Williams ever occupied any
leadership role in the Rollin 30s Crips. Nor is there any evidence that Mr.
Williams directed, planned or otherwise exercised discretion in connection
with the offense. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in finding Mr. Williams
guilty of violating CR § 9-805.
Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed.
DISSENT: The majority’s interpretation of CR § 9-805 departs from
established interpretive principles in two critical respects. First, it imposes a
knowledge requirement found nowhere in the statutory text, contradicting the
General Assembly’s deliberate choice to include such requirements in
neighboring provisions while omitting them here. Second, it eviscerates the
plain meaning of the word “promote” through a limited construction that finds
no basis in the statutory language, context or legislative purpose. For these
reasons, I would affirm the conviction.